Incentive mechanisms for large collaborative resource sharing

TitleIncentive mechanisms for large collaborative resource sharing
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2004
AuthorsRanganathan, K., M. Ripeanu, A. Sarin, and I. Foster
Conference NameCluster Computing and the Grid, 2004. CCGrid 2004. IEEE International Symposium on
Pagination1 - 8
Date Publishedapr.
Keywordsautonomous entities, client-server systems, distributed collaborations, grid computing, Grids, groupware, incentive mechanisms, large collaborative resource sharing, multi-person prisoner dilemma, peer-to-peer systems, resource allocation, soft-incentive schemes
Abstract

We study the nature of sharing resources in distributed collaborations such as Grids and peer-to-peer systems. By applying the theoretical framework of the multi-person prisoner's dilemma to this resource sharing problem, we show that in the absence of incentive schemes, individual users are apt to hold back resources, leading to decreased system utility. Using both the theoretical framework as well as simulations, we compare and contrast three different incentive schemes aimed at encouraging users to contribute resources. Our results show that soft-incentive schemes are effective in incentivizing autonomous entities to collaborate, leading to increased gains for all participants in the system.

URLhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CCGrid.2004.1336542
DOI10.1109/CCGrid.2004.1336542

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