Decentralized Activation in Dense Sensor Networks via Global Games

TitleDecentralized Activation in Dense Sensor Networks via Global Games
Publication TypeJournal Article
Year of Publication2008
AuthorsKrishnamurthy, V.
JournalSignal Processing, IEEE Transactions on
Volume56
Pagination4936 -4950
Date Publishedoct.
ISSN1053-587X
KeywordsBayes methods, Bayes-Nash equilibrium conditions, Bayesian estimates, decentralized activation, dense sensor networks, energy-efficient monitoring, game theory, global games, probability distribution, statistical distributions, wireless sensor networks
Abstract

Decentralized activation in wireless sensor networks is investigated for energy-efficient monitoring using the theory of global games. Given a large number of sensors which can operate in either an energy-efficient #x201C;low-resolution #x201D; monitoring mode, or a more costly #x201C;high-resolution #x201D; mode, the problem of computing and executing a strategy for mode selection is formulated as a global game with diverse utilities and noise conditions. Each sensor measures its environmental conditions in noise, and determines whether to enter a #x201C;high-resolution #x201D; mode based on its expected contribution and energy cost, which relies on Bayesian estimates of others' observations and actions. We formulate Bayes-Nash equilibrium conditions for which a simple threshold strategy is competitively optimal for each sensor, and propose a scheme for decentralized threshold computation. The threshold level and its equilibrium properties depend on the prior probability distribution of environmental conditions and the observation noise, and we give conditions for equilibrium of the threshold strategy as a function of the prior and observation noise. We also illustrate an interesting phase transition property of the Nash equilibrium for high congestion or low noise variance.

URLhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TSP.2008.926978
DOI10.1109/TSP.2008.926978

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